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The Politics of Prosecutions under the
Convention Against Torture
Aaron Solomon*
Recent incidents suggest that prosecutions under the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("Convention Against Torture")1 are highly vulnerable to political pressures brought
to bear by the potential defendant and his state. The dismissal of charges against
former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre in Senegal and the detention and release of
Peruvian Major Tomas Ricardo Anderson Kohatsu in the United States indicate that
the successful prosecution of Augusto Pinochet under the Convention Against
Torture was essentially an anomaly rather than the beginning of a new trend.
The prosecution of Pinochet established the precedent that former-Head-of-
State immunity, and by extension all diplomatic immunities, do not apply to acts of
torture.2 The decision was a concrete application of Article 5 of the Convention
Against Torture, which requires nations to extradite or prosecute alleged torturers
within their boundaries regardless of where the alleged crimes took place.3 The
decision was widely hailed as one that would put fear into dictators around the world;4
however, it has done little to influence countries to prosecute individuals under the
Convention Against Torture.' Subsequent prosecutions that were begun ended in
failure as the result of political interference in thejudicial process.
Hissene Habre, dictator of Chad from 1982 to 1990, has been implicated in
40,000 murders and a large-scale pattern of torture. He was indicted in Senegal in
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2. See David Bosco, Dictators in the Dock, The American Prospect 26 (Aug 14, 2000).
3. Convention Against Torture Art 5 (cited in note 1).
4. See, for example, EditorialJustice Denied in Sengal, NY Times A18 Uuly 21, 2000).
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February 2000 on charges of torture.' Far from advocating on Habre's behalf, Chad
(now ruled by Habres former army chief of staff) lent its support to the prosecution
of other members of Habres regime still in Chad.7 Although Senegal had been known
for its independent judiciary, the charges against Habre were dismissed in July 2000,
and journalists generally agree that the dismissal was due to high-level tampering.'
While the case was under consideration, a panel headed by the president of Senegal
removed the investigating judge! The President then promoted the head of the
Indicting Chamber, the body that issues the actual indictments, and it was this judge
who soon after dismissed the case against Habre.'0 Moreover, the President appointed
Habre's lawyer as a paid consultant to the government." Commentators have
suggested that this interference may have been due to Habre's connections within
Senegal's wealthy elite, and the well-financed lobbying and media campaign he ran
while under investigation 2 that characterized him as an African who was being
persecuted by "reactionary and neocolonial French circles." 13
Senegal dismissed the charges against Habre on the grounds that his crimes were
not committed in Senegal and that the applicable statute of limitations had run. 4
However, Senegal signed and ratified the Convention Against Torture in 1986." This
treaty clearly grants jurisdiction under Article 5 for "offences in cases where the
alleged offender is present in any territory" under the jurisdiction of the prosecuting
state, regardless of where the criminal acts took place." Moreover, under Senegalese
law, the ten-year statute of limitations only began to run in 1990, when Habre was
deposed and prosecutions became possible; the charges against Habre were filed
within this period.17
Although of dubious value as precedent because it ignored rather than
interpreted the Convention Against Torture, the decision on its face did not challenge
the Pinochet holding. The Senegalese court did not reach the questions of Head-of-
6. See Norimitsu Onishi, Former Leader of Chad: Human Rights Abuser or Cold War Pawn?: Calling the
Powerful to Account/'My.Joy Was Great in That Courtroom,' Intl Herald Trib 2 (Mar 2, 2000).
7. See Human Rights Watch, Chad: Hissene Habre's Victims Demand justice, available online at
<www.hrw.org/press/2000/10/habrel026.htm> (visited Mar 23,2001).
8. See, for examplejustice Denied in Senegal, NY Times at A18 (cited in note 4).
9. See Human Rights Watch, Senegal Actions on Ex-Cbad Dictator Deplored, available online at
<www.hrw.org/press/2000/07/habre07O5.htm> (visited Mar 23, 2001).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Human Rights Watch, Case Against Ex-Chad Dictator Debated, available online at
<www.hrw.org/press/2000/05/habreO5l6.htm> (visited on Mar 23, 2001).
13. Chad's Ex-Dictator Habre Denounces Torture Charges As *Calumnies,* Agence France Presse (Feb 14,
2000).
14. See Human Rights Watch, Case Against F.x-Cbad Dictator Debated (cited in note 12).
15. Id.
16. Convention Against Torture (cited in note 1).
17. See Human Rights Watch, Case Against F.x-Chad Dictator Debated (cited in note 12).
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State immunity or dual criminality which were so central to the Pinochet prosecution,
but rested instead on issues of territorial jurisdiction and the statute of limitations.
The flimsy nature of the pretexts relied upon to dismiss the charges against Habre
might suggest that the court did not avoid explicitly overruling Pinochet because it
considered it too powerful to change. If it feared scrutiny, surely the court could have
developed a more compelling rationale for setting Habre free. However, it is more
likely the court considered the Pinochet decision too weak to restrain it and simply
found it easier to ignore rather than challenge.
Major Tomas Ricardo Anderson Kohatsu flew to the United States in March
2000 to take part in a hearing of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.m
He was detained in transit by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), which
questioned him regarding acts of torture he was alleged to have committed as an
intelligence officer in Peru. After several hours of interrogation the FBI was prepared
to arrest him.19 It seems likely that the Justice Department sought to prosecute
Anderson under domestic laws mandated by the Convention Against Torture.
Criminal penalties took effect when the Convention Against Torture was ratified by
the United States in 1994, and the law lays down severe penalties for "whoever outside
the United States comrmts or attempts to commit torture.' This legislation complies
with Article 5 of the Convention Against Torture which requires each party to take
action to establish jurisdiction over offenders in its territory. While Anderson was
derdined, the Justice Department contacted potential witnesses and began to prepare a
case against hima yet Anderson was released in the early morning hours the day after
his detention at the urging of the State Department, which argued that he had
diplomatic immunity as the result of his visa status. '
The decision by the State Department to release Anderson was clearly politically
driven. While the issue has never actually been litigated or officially determined, it was
the opinion of the Justice Department, on firm legal grounds, that Andersons G-2
visa, which allows certain individuals who would otherwise be ineligible for visas to
enter the country to take part in the business of international organizations, did not
grant him diplomatic immunity.' Even if Anderson had some form of diplomatic
18. See State Dept. Helped Peruvian Accused of Torture Avoid Arrest, NY Times A7 (Mar 11, 2000).
19. See Coletta A. Youngers, The Pinorbke Ricdrbet, Nation 5 (May 8, 2000).
20. While it was reported that Anderson was to have been prosecuted under the Torture Victims
Protection Act, this act provides only a civil remedy against torturers. See, for example, Karen
DeYoung and Lorraine Adams, US Fres Accused Torturer Hurran Rips Groups D:ury Ruling on
Peruvian, Wash Post Al (Mar 11, 2000); Youngers, Tkr Pinw&et Ricet,, Nation at 5 (cited in note
19); Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 USC § 1350 (Supp 2000).
21. 28 USC § 1350.






immunity, the Pinochet decision suggests that it might not have applied to his crimes
against humanity.'
As a general matter, determinations regarding to whom a certain law applies are
made first by the Justice Department when it decides to prosecute that individual and
then reviewed by the judicial branch. This procedure was followed in the Pinochet
case and is employed in conventional prosecutions. The State Department becomes
involved only when political issues are implicated; in this case it overruled the Justice
Department for political reasons. In the words of one official, "This floats up to State
and the NSC [National Security Council], and they come back with 'We have to let
him walk." s
The United States likely felt it could ill afford the political cost of prosecuting
Anderson. A cooperative relationship with Peru is important to the United States for
a number of reasons, including drug eradication and interdiction. Even if the only
concern was protecting human rights in Peru, a prosecution of Anderson might have
done more harm than good. Peru is under a great deal of pressure from the United
States regarding its human rights record. In October of 1999 Peru was censored by
the United States Senate for "anti-democratic measures" and the Peruvian embassy
in Washington continues to devote an entire section of their website to defending
Peru's handling of the case of Lori Berenson, an American accused of membership in a
leftist rebel group and sentenced by a Peruvian military court to life in prison for
treason.2 The State Department has chosen to work with Peru to address issues of
human rights and democracy' and clearly finds this approach more suitable than
confrontation. This dialogue was in a sensitive period when Anderson was arrested.
The day before Anderson was detained the State Department had issued a statement
expressing its deep concern regarding the pre-election conditions in Peru and
describing its efforts to encourage the government to strengthen the democratic
process.' The State Department likely feared that its ability to pressure President
Fujimori to allow a democratic election would have been seriously jeopardized by the
prosecution of Anderson.
Prosecutions under the Convention Against Torture are vulnerable to a wide
range of pressures. Habre was able to get the president of Senegal to quash his
25. See, for example, the opinion of Lord Hutton in R v Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Magistrate and
Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 AC 147 (House of Lords 1999).
26. DeYoung and Adams, US Frees Accused Torturer, Wash Post at Al (cited in note 20).
27. S Res 209, 106rh Cong 1st Sess, in 145 Cong Rec S 14334 (Nov 8,1999).
28. The Lori Berenson Case, available online at <www.peruemb.org/frlori.htm> (visited Mar 23, 2001).
29. United States Department of State, Background Notes: Peru, available online at
<http://www.state.gov/www/background.notes/peru-0300/bgn.html> (visited Mar 23,2001).
30. Statement by State Department Spokesman James P. Rubin, Peruvian Elections-Visit of Prime
Minister Bustamante, (Mar 9, 2000) available online at
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/sratements/2000/psOO0309.html > (visited Mar 23,
2001).
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indictment because he had integrated himself into the wealthy elite of Senegalese
society and had the contacts necessary to pull the needed strings.3' Anderson, in
contrast, escaped not because of his personal power but because his prosecution
would have damaged relations between Peru and the United States. With the
exception of extreme circumstances such as Nuremberg, defendants are generally able
to develop one or both of these types of pressure. Pinochet was actually able to exert
both-he had powerful friends in the United Kingdom and abroad, such as Margaret
Thatcher and George Bush, and he had the support of the government of Chile. Only
the fact that the prosecutor had been preparing the case for a long time prior to
Pinochets arrival in the UK, was from a third county, and was able to execute an
Interpol warrant outside the British and Spanish political structure' prevented
Pinochet from escaping prosecution like Anderson. Once in the judicial system, the
prosecution could not easily be influenced by political means given the strength of the
independent judiciary and the public support for his prosecution. Although the
Pinochet Principle may retain nominal legal force, it is likely only in these unusual
circumstances-an uncontested entry into the court system, an independent judiciary
and strong public pressure-that the political forces that tend to prevent successful
prosecutions can be subverted.
31. Human Rights Watch, Senegal Actions on Ex-Cad Dictator Dq'ard (cited in note 12).
32. See Michadel Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinodr:t Case, 10 Duke J Camp & Ind L 415, 422
(2000).
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